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Abstract
This article scrutinises the logic behind the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy focusing on their implications for the right to family 
reuniﬁcation under EU law. Speciﬁc attention is devoted to the phenomenon of reverse discrimination in 
the context of the new jurisdiction test established by the Court, which is based on the severity of the 
Member States’ interference with EU citizenship rights rather than on a pure cross-border logic. EU citi-
zens unable to establish a link with EU law are often subject to stricter family reuniﬁcation requirements 
in comparison to their migrant compatriots and even certain third country nationals. It is argued that this 
situation is diﬃcult to accept in light of the principles of legal certainty, equality and the protection of 
fundamental rights. A new balance between EU citizenship and Member States’ regulatory autonomy is 
established but legislative action is required to solve the outstanding problems.
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1. Introduction
The right to family reuniﬁcation is an essential part of EU law. From the early 
days onwards, it has been recognised that the granting of rights to third country 
family members of a migrant Member State national is of crucial importance to 
ensure the eﬀet utile of the freedom of movement for persons.1 The introduction 
of EU citizenship with the Treaty of Maastricht extended the scope of application 
of family reuniﬁcation rights to Member State nationals that are not involved in 
economic activities. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
immediately asserted that EU citizenship ‘is not intended to extend the scope 
rationae materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with 
Community [now Union] law’.2 In other words, EU citizens can only rely on 
1) Groenendijk, K., ‘Family Reuniﬁcation as a Right under Community Law’, 2006 EJML 8(2), pp. 215–
230.
2) Joint cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen [1997] 
ECR I-3171, para. 23. 
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their EU citizenship rights, including a right of residence for their third country 
family members, when they fall within the scope of application of EU law. If their 
situation has no link with EU law, they are subject to the often more restrictive 
national rules of the Member States. This leads to the well-known phenomenon 
of reverse discrimination.3
The potential for reverse discrimination entirely depends on the dividing line 
between the scopes of EU and national law. This line is virtually never straightfor-
ward, to which the recent Court judgments in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy 
provide excellent illustrations. In both cases, the CJEU was confronted with the 
question whether third country nationals can derive a right of residence from 
their family relationship with an EU citizen who has never exercised free move-
ment rights.
Making a swift move away from the traditionalist cross-border situation logic,4 
in Ruiz Zambrano, the Grand Chamber of the Court accepted that the Colom-
bian father of ‘static’ Belgian children had a right to reside and work under EU 
law because the children would otherwise be deprived of the genuine enjoyment 
of their rights as citizens of the Union.5 This new approach to jurisdiction justify-
ing the Court’s interference on the grounds of the severity of Member States’ 
interference with EU citizens’ rights6 rather than on a pure cross-border logic was 
generally reconﬁrmed by the Court’s Third Chamber in McCarthy without, how-
ever, bringing about the same result: the judges found that an adult EU citizen 
could not rely on EU law to regularise the residence of her Jamaican husband in 
the United Kingdom in the absence of any cross-border movement. Her dual 
citizenship in itself was not accepted as a suﬃcient linking factor with EU law.7 
Moreover, Mrs. McCarthy’s inability to have proper family life in the UK, curi-
ously, was not viewed by the Court as a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of 
EU citizenship rights.8
Following a brief presentation of the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy judgments 
(2.) this contribution turns to the analysis of their implications for the drawing of 
the borderline between national law and EU law. The new jurisdiction test these 
cases helped to establish has clear implications for the scope of application of the 
3) Hanf, D., ‘“Reverse Discrimination” in EU Law: Constitutional Aberation, Constitutional Necessity, 
or Judicial Choice’, 2011 MJ 18(1–2), pp. 26–61; Van Elsuwege, P. & Adam, S., ‘Situations purement 
internes, discriminations à rebours et collectivités autonomes après l’arrêt sur l’Assurances soins ﬂamande’, 
2008 Cahiers de droit européen, pp. 655–711; Tryfonidou, A., ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal 
Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe’, 2008 LIEI 35(1), pp. 43–67. 
4) And following Rottmann in this respect, see case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] 
ECR I-1449.
5) Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Oﬃce national de l’emploi, [2011] ECR I-0000. 
6) Kochenov, D., ‘A Real European Citizenship, A New Jurisdiction Test, A Novel Chapter of the Devel-
opment of the Union in Europe’, 2011 CJEL 18 (forthcoming).
7) Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] ECR I-0000, 
paras. 40–41. 
8) Ibid., para. 49.
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rules governing family reuniﬁcation of EU citizens (3.). The section that follows 
is devoted to the paradoxical implications of reverse discrimination in the ﬁeld of 
family reuniﬁcation (4.). It is often so that EU law is a vital opening to avoid 
restrictive national regulation which creates a reality where Union citizens that are 
unable to prove a link with EU law are sometimes subjected to stricter rules on 
family reuniﬁcation in comparison to third country nationals that are lawfully 
residing in the territory of the Union. This is diﬃcult to accept in light of prin-
ciples such as legal certainty, equality and the protection of fundamental rights. 
Having demonstrated the imperfections of the current state of regulation (5.), the 
contribution points at the limits of judicial intervention for the protection of 
family reuniﬁcation as a fundamental human right (6.).
2. Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy Compared
2.1. Factual Background
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano, his wife and their three-year old son, all Colombian nation-
als, came to Belgium in 1999 and applied for asylum due to the civil war in 
Colombia. The Belgian authorities refused their application and ordered them to 
leave the country. Signiﬁcantly, a non-refoulement clause was included into the 
decision of the competent authorities due to the ongoing troubles in Colombia.9 
So the family remained in Belgium without any work or residence permits. They 
were oﬃcially registered with the municipality where they settled10 and Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano worked on a permanent employment contract paying all the required 
taxes and social security contributions.11 In the meanwhile, his wife gave birth to 
two more children (Diego and Jessica) who acquired Belgian nationality accord-
ing to a provision of the Belgian Nationality Code aiming at the reduction of 
statelessness.12 Numerous attempts of the family to regularise their situation in 
Belgium were unsuccessful.13
When Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s employment contract was temporarily suspended 
in 2005, after ﬁve years of continuous employment, he applied for unemploy-
ment beneﬁts with the National Employment Oﬃce. This application was 
rejected since he was not in possession of a work permit. Moreover, the Belgian 
 9) Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 20.
10) Ibid., para. 22.
11) Ibid., para. 23.
12) Since the children were not registered with the Colombian consulate, they did not acquire Colombian 
nationality and were thus stateless in the eyes of the Belgian authorities. The reluctance of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano to register his children as Colombian nationals is quite understandable, given what he had to 
go through in that country, where his ﬁrst sun was kidnapped by the guerillas and kept hostage for a week: 
See para. 16 of the judgment.
13) Ibid., para. 23.
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authorities obliged his company to ﬁre him on the spot,14 leaving the family with 
no means of subsistence. Mr. Ruiz Zambrano challenged this decision claiming 
that as a parent of minor Belgian children, he was entitled to reside and work in 
Belgium on the basis of the provisions related to EU citizenship.15 The Employ-
ment Tribunal in Brussels submitted a preliminary reference asking the CJEU 
whether the situation at issue fell within the scope of EU law, notwithstanding 
the fact that the children never exercised their free movement rights.16
Shirley McCarthy was born and has always resided in her native United King-
dom relying on social assistance. Following her marriage to a Jamaican national 
who could not obtain a leave to remain under UK laws, she activated her dor-
mant Irish nationality expecting to create a cross-border situation to beneﬁt from 
more lenient EU family reuniﬁcation rules. Together with her husband, she 
applied for a residence permit in the UK on the basis of EU law as a migrant EU 
citizen of Irish nationality accompanied by a spouse. The Secretary of State refused 
these applications on the ground that Mrs. McCarthy did not qualify as a worker, 
self-employed person or self-suﬃcient person under EU law.17 She was in receipt 
of State beneﬁts, and has never stayed in any country other than the UK. Since 
she was deemed as unable to beneﬁt from EU law in such a situation, her hus-
band could not have any derivative residence right either. The referring court 
essentially asked whether the situation of Mrs. McCarthy fell within the scope of 
EU law by virtue of her dual nationality notwithstanding the fact that she never 
exercised her right of free movement and always resided in one Member State of 
which she is a national.
2.2. The Diametrically Opposed Opinions of AGs Sharpston and Kokott
Despite the largely comparable questions regarding the scope of application of 
EU law, the opinions delivered by AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano and by AG 
Kokott in McCarthy are strikingly diﬀerent. Whereas Sharpston argued that citi-
zenship in itself could be a suﬃcient connecting factor to EU law irrespective of 
the existence of an a priori movement between the Member States,18 AG Kokott 
restated an old mantra that EU citizenship law only applies in a cross-border 
context.19 These divergent visions reﬂect a long-standing debate in academic lit-
erature regarding the viability of the principle that the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of persons – including the rules on EU citizenship – cannot be applied 
to situations which are conﬁned in all relevant respects to a single Member State. 
In particular, it has been argued by many that the (potential) existence of reverse 
14) Ibid., para 27.
15) Ibid., para. 34.
16) Ibid., para. 35.
17) Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000, paras. 14–17.
18) Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 100–101. 
19) Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy, paras. 30–31.
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discrimination as a result of the interaction between EU law and national law is 
diﬃcult to reconcile with a Union that is based on the rule of law and the prin-
ciple of equal treatment, let alone with the Internal Market thinking.20
Developing her line of argument familiar from the earlier Flemish Care Insur-
ance case,21 AG Sharpston delivered an Opinion of remarkable sophistication and 
clarity, critically pointing out the practical problems of distinguishing between 
purely internal and cross-border situations under the Court’s traditional case 
law.22
With a view to avoiding instances where the classiﬁcation of some situation as 
wholly internal or cross-border is tenuous at best, the AG recommended the 
Court to recognize the existence of a free-standing right of residence for EU citi-
zens and, consequently, their family members upon which they are dependent to 
beneﬁt from such right,23 thus ‘seriously addressing the issue of reverse 
discrimination’.24 AG Kokott expressed contrarian views arguing in her Opinion 
in McCarthy that EU citizens cannot derive a right of residence vis-à-vis their 
Member State of nationality in the absence of a cross-border element.25 The mere 
fact that Mrs. McCarthy also had an Irish passport was deemed insuﬃcient to 
satisfy this criterion because, from the point of view of the law on residence, she 
is in the same situation as other British nationals who never left their country of 
origin.26
With regard to reverse discrimination, AG Kokott merely recalled the 
Court’s established position that ‘EU law provides no means of dealing with this 
problem.’27 Signiﬁcantly, she also acknowledged that ‘it cannot be ruled out that 
the Court will review its case-law when the occasion arises’ but considered that 
the McCarthy case did not provide the right context for such a step.28 AG Sharp-
ston, on the other hand, proposed to remedy reverse discrimination on the basis 
of Article 18 TFEU when three cumulative conditions are fulﬁlled.29 First, the 
claimant has to be a ‘static’ Union citizen whose situation is comparable, in all 
other material respects, to that of his migrant compatriots. Second, the reverse 
discrimination would have to entail a violation of a fundamental right protected 
under EU law. Third, Article 18 TFEU would only be applied when national law 
does not aﬀord adequate fundamental rights protection.
20) Kochenov, D., Citizenship without Respect: The EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper (NYU Law School 2010) 08/10, pp. 34–54 (and the literature cited therein). 
21) Case C-212/96, Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v. Flemish Government 
[2008] ECR I-1683; Van Elsuwege & Adam, supra note 16, p. 327.
22) Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 85–88.
23) Ibid., para. 101. 
24) Ibid., para. 139.
25) Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy, para. 31.
26) Ibid., para. 37.
27) Ibid., para. 40.
28) Ibid., paras. 42–43.
29) Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, paras. 145–148.
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Finally, both Sharpston and Kokott dealt with the question whether the funda-
mental right to family life played a role in the two cases. According to settled case 
law, EU fundamental rights may only be invoked when the contested measure 
comes within the scope of application of EU law.30 Given the perceived absence 
of such a triggering factor in McCarthy, AG Kokott bluntly observed that this was 
not an issue of EU law and exclusively belonged to the jurisdiction of the national 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights.31 In contrast, AG Sharpston 
proposed to extend the scope of EU fundamental rights protection to all areas 
falling within the scope of material EU competence.32 However, she also acknowl-
edged that, at the time of the relevant facts, the fundamental right to family life 
could not be invoked as a free-standing right. Such a development ‘requires both 
an evolution in the case-law and an unequivocal statement from the constituent 
powers of the EU (its Member States)’.33
2.3. The Judgments: Similar Reasoning Leading To Opposing Outcomes
The divergent perspectives of the Advocates General are, to a certain extent, 
reﬂected in the respective judgments of the Court of Justice. Without opening 
the gates to the unconditional application of EU citizenship rules to all purely 
internal situations, and following its decision in Rottmann decided a year earlier,34 
the Grand Chamber in Ruiz Zambrano concluded that ‘Article 20 TFEU pre-
cludes national measures which have the eﬀect to depriving citizens of the Union 
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union’.35 Just as it did earlier in Rottmann, rather 
than trying to construct a cross-border situation, the Court focused on the impli-
cations of the national measures for the eﬀective exercise of EU citizenship rights. 
Instead of a cross-border element, the severity of Member States’ interference 
with EU citizenship rights was used as the decisive criterion to bring a situation 
within the ambit of EU law. Proceeding from the observation that Belgian chil-
dren would be unable to beneﬁt from their rights as EU citizens when Ruiz Zam-
brano is driven by the national authorities outside of the territory of the Union, 
the Court concluded that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano could derive work and residence 
rights from EU law. This right was based directly and exclusively on Article 20 
30) Case 5/88, Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, para. 22; Case C-2/92, Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, para. 16; 
Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood [2003] ECR I-7411, 
para. 68.
31) Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy, para. 60.
32) Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 163. 
33) Ibid. para. 173. 
34) Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449. Also: Kochenov, D., ‘Annotation of Case C-135/08 
Rottmann’, 2010 CMLRev. 47(6), pp. 1831–1846; De Groot, G.-R., ‘Overwegingen over de Janko 
Rottmann-beslissing van het Europese Hof van Justitie’, 2010 Asiel & migrantenrecht 1(5–6), pp. 293–
300.
35) Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 42. 
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TFEU. The Court reasonably concluded that Directive 2004/38, which includes 
an explicit cross-border requirement and speciﬁc provisions on residence rights 
for third-country family members, ‘does not apply to a situation such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings’.36
The Court followed the same reasoning in McCarthy. Firstly, it conﬁrmed that 
Directive 2004/38 only applies to citizens who move to or reside in a Member 
State other than that of which they are a national.37 The conditions laid down in 
Directive 2004/38 cannot apply to static Union citizens because, as a principle of 
international law, Member States cannot refuse its own nationals the right to 
reside in its territory.38 Hence, a Union citizen who has never exercised his right 
of free movement and has always resided in the Member State of which he is a 
national falls outside the scope of application of Directive 2004/38. The mere fact 
that a static Union citizen is a national of more than one Member State does not 
change this situation.39
However, just as in Ruiz Zambrano, as a result of the hierarchy of norms, the 
non-application of Directive 2004/38 does not necessarily imply that static EU 
citizens cannot derive any rights from their EU citizenship status under primary 
EU law. The Court therefore examined the application of Article 21 TFEU to the 
case at stake – even though this was not explicitly asked by the referring court – 
and also applied the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ introduced in Rottmann and Ruiz 
Zambrano in order to see whether the situation of Mrs. McCarthy could be 
brought within the scope of EU law. The Court concluded that EU citizenship 
precludes the adoption of national measures that ‘have the eﬀect of depriving 
Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred 
by virtue of that status, or of impeding the exercise of the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States’.40 In other words, the traditional 
jurisdiction test based on cross-border situation analysis and a new test con-
structed around the necessity to ensure that EU citizens are not deprived of the 
genuine enjoyment of EU citizenship rights were applied by the Court side by 
side. The CJEU found that the situation of Mrs. McCarthy did not meet the 
requirements of either of the two. According to the Court, the failure of the Brit-
ish authorities to grant her a right of residence in the UK does not aﬀect her right 
of free movement or any other EU citizenship right. In contrast to the Belgian 
children in Ruiz Zambrano, she did not face a threat to leave the territory of the 
Union which would make the beneﬁt of her EU citizenship rights impossible. 
36) Ibid., para. 39. 
37) Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000, paras. 31–39.
38) Ibid., para. 29. There is an obvious tension with the Ruiz Zambrano reasoning here, since international 
law was not invoked by the Grand Chamber in that case in a situation when Belgium was doing exactly 
that: refusing its own nationals a possibility to reside in the country: Kochenov, supra note 6.
39) Ibid., para. 41.
40) Ibid., para. 49 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, she enjoys, under a principle of international law, an unconditional 
right of residence in the UK as a national of this country.41 In both cases, there is 
a notable silence on the right to family life.
3. The Scope of Application of EU Citizenship: Where to Draw the 
Boundaries?
3.1. The Application of the ‘Cross-border’ and the ‘Genuine Enjoyment’ Tests
The reasoning of the CJEU in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy makes it clear that 
the boundaries between the scopes of application of EU and national law cannot 
any more be reduced to a simple distinction between cross-border and purely 
internal situations. Rather than the formal existence of a cross-border element, 
however artiﬁcially constructed,42 the implications of national measures for the 
eﬀective reliance on EU citizenship rights43 are crucial when deciding whether or 
not EU law is applicable. Even with no cross-border element present, a particular 
situation can ‘by reason of its nature and its consequences’ fall within the ambit 
of EU law.44 In other words, the traditional cross-border situation test is comple-
mented by the severity of interference, or ‘genuine enjoyment’ test.
A new test to replace (at least potentially) the old cross-border situation test of 
the CJEU was sorely needed.45 Notwithstanding the fact that the Court applies a 
teleological interpretation of the cross-border requirement, meaning that the 
implications of a national measure on the actual or potential exercise of the right 
to move and reside in another Member State are crucial for the determination 
whether or not a situation falls within the scope ratione materiae of EU law, the 
test often failed to produce predictable and convincing results, remaining largely 
procedural in nature.46 Most importantly, it failed to shape clarity in the eyes of 
ordinary EU citizens who would otherwise ﬁnd themselves in materially identical 
situations why some situations would fall within the scope of EU law in the eyes 
41) Ibid., para. 50.
42) It is established case law that a situation of an EU citizen who never exercised her free movement rights 
cannot, for that reason alone, be equaled with a wholly internal situation. A long line of cases illustrates 
that cross-border situations can be constructed without any physical movement in space: Case C-200/02, 
Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613; Case C-403/03, 
Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421. For analysis see Kochenov, supra note 20, pp. 34–52; Spaventa, E., ‘Seeing 
the Wood despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Eﬀects’, 2008 
CMLRev 45(1), pp. 13–46, at p. 14.
43) This includes, as has been clariﬁed in Rottmann, the very possession of the legal status of EU citizen-
ship: Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, para. 42.
44) Ibid.
45) Kochenov (2011 CJEL), supra note 6.
46) Spaventa, supra note 42, p. 14; Nic Shuibhne 2002. ‘The European Union and Fundamental Rights: Well 
in Spirit but Considerably Rumpled in Body?’, in: Paul Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (Eds.), Conver-
gence and Divergence in European Public Law, Hart, Oxford, p. 188; Kochenov, supra note 20, p. 34.
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of the CJEU and others would not. The Court’s attempts to deploy the teleologi-
cal vision of the cross-border element test with a view to diminishing the scale of 
reverse discrimination, however admirable, deluded the essence of its approach to 
the delimitation of the scopes of the two legal orders in the Union.47 A nationality 
of one’s former wife, like in Schempp,48 could create a cross-border situation, just 
as a potential willingness to exercise free movement rights in the future, as in 
Garcia Avello.49
The main novelty of Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy consists in the fact that 
building on Rottmann, they oﬀered an alternative to cross-border thinking, which 
is grounded in the concept of EU citizenship as such, not in the idea of actually 
or potentially crossing the internal borders of the Union.50 The latter was bound 
to lose much of its appeal upon the creation of EU citizenship – a concept which 
is not economic in nature51 – and the completion of the Internal Market, making 
real the ‘area without internal frontiers’52 the Treaties speak about. Consequently, 
it is only logical to look beyond the internal borders in framing the scope of EU 
law. And this is exactly what the Court has done,53 unfortunately without provid-
ing much information to explain this fundamental paradigm shift. It is not sur-
prising that the new ‘genuine enjoyment’ and the traditional ‘cross-border 
situation’ tests overlap: the CJEU does not change the essence of the Union and 
respects the principle of conferral. What it does, is providing an alternative way 
to consider the grounds of applicability of EU law. Consequently, the absolute 
majority of cross-border situations could potentially come under the umbrella of 
the ‘genuine enjoyment’ test. The new test merely supplies a more logically coher-
ent ground for the invocation of EU rules: demonstrating that the Union is sim-
ply protecting its citizens’ rights from disproportionate Member State interference 
is inﬁnitely more convincing than arguing that the intervention is necessary since 
a Union citizen in question has crossed an internal border.54
47) Tryfonidou, A., 2009. ‘In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: Has 
the Court of Justice Missed the Point?’. CMLRev. 46(5), pp. 1591–1620; Kochenov, supra note 20, 
pp. 47–52.
48) Case C-403/03, Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421, para. 22; Spaventa, supra note 42, p. 21.
49) Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. 
50) Hailbronner, K. & Thym, D., ‘Annotation of Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano’, 2010 CMLRev. 48(4), 
pp. 1253–1271, at p. 1257; Van der Mei, A.P., Van den Boogaert, S.C.G. & De Groot, G.R., ‘De arresten 
Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy. Het Hof van Justitie en het eﬀectieve genot van EU burgerschapsrechten’, 
2011 NTER 17 (6), pp. 188–199.
51) But see Nic Shuibhne, N., ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’, 2010 CMLRev. 47(6), 
pp. 1597–1629.
52) Art. 26(2) TFEU.
53) This has for the ﬁrst time happened in Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055, but 
was forcefully reaﬃrmed in Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, where the new approach to 
jurisdiction has been explicitly formulated by the Court. On the former see Kochenov, D., ‘The Impact 
of European Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European 
Community’, 2009 LIEI 36(3), pp. 239–256.
54) Kochenov, supra note 6.
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The duality of tests to delineate the scope of application of EU citizenship law 
reﬂects the structure of the relevant Treaty provisions. Whereas the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States as laid down in Article 
21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38 only applies in an inter-State context, this is not 
necessarily the case for the non-exhaustive list of citizenship rights under Article 
20 TFEU.55 From this perspective, the granting of a residence right in Ruiz Zam-
brano is not so much related to his children’s right to reside and move within the 
Union but more to the full application of their citizenship rights in general. For 
this reason, the Court in this case explicitly refers to Article 20 TFEU and not to 
Article 21 TFEU.56 Moreover, any ‘future exercise’ of free movement rights is not 
mentioned. This very telling silence of the Court cannot be ignored. With regard 
to the situation of Mrs. McCarthy, on the other hand, the Court considered that 
she did not face a potential deprivation of her general citizenship rights. In con-
trast to the minor children of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano, who were under a de facto 
obligation to leave the territory of the Union unless at least their father was 
granted a right to reside and work,57 Mrs. McCarthy enjoyed a stable residence in 
the UK. Hence, her situation did not trigger the application of Article 20 TFEU. 
Moreover, in the absence of any eﬀective cross-border element she failed to fall 
within the scope of Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38.
The fact that there are now two tests of jurisdiction at the disposal of the Court 
raises questions with regard to the continued relevance of the purely internal rule. 
Although the regulatory autonomy of the Member States enshrined in Article 5 
TEU is obviously aﬀected,58 a parallel can be drawn, following Ankersmit and 
Geursen, with the functioning of the principles of equivalence and eﬀectiveness 
in EU procedural law.59 Member States are free to put up any regulation as long 
as it does not profoundly undermine the status of EU citizenship and the rights 
associated therewith.
It is crucial, in this context, to have a clear idea of what ‘the genuine enjoyment 
of the substance of rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the 
Union’ means – the Court will have to be very thorough in addressing this issue. 
As the law stands today, it appears that the threshold to conclude that a measure 
55) The word ‘inter alia’ in the Article 20 TFEU enumeration of EU citizenship rights seems of funda-
mental importance here. 
56) This is all the more remarkable because AG Sharpston did base her reasoning essentially on Article 21 
TFEU. 
57) Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was in possession of a temporary residence permit – valid for the duration of his 
action against the Belgian authorities – when the CJEU decided the case: Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano 
[2011] ECR I-0000, para. 24. 
58) Hailbronner & Thym, supra note 50, p. 1253; Nic Shuibhne, Niamh, ‘Seven Questions for Seven 
Paragraphs’, 2011 ELRev. 36(2), pp. 161–163.
59) While Member States are free to establish their own rules of procedure, these have to respect the prin-
ciples of EU law in not making the recourse to EU law impossible or more diﬃcult than to national law: 
Ankersmit, L. & Geursen, W., ‘Ruiz Zambrano: De interne situatie voorbij’, 2011 Asiel & Migrantenrecht 
no. 4, p. 156.
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deprives a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the rights connected with 
that status is rather high, covering situations where a citizen’s residence in the 
Union, like in Ruiz Zambrano, or his/her status as citizen of the Union is at stake, 
like in Rottmann. It is thus impossible to be certain whether static EU citizens 
would receive an opportunity to invoke their EU citizenship rights with ease 
against their home Member States to claim, inter alia, a right to family reuniﬁca-
tion, or non-discrimination under Article 18 TFEU. Further clariﬁcations from 
the CJEU are required in order to see how far the new jurisdiction test is able to 
stretch the scope of EU law compared with what has been covered by the old 
approach already. Are we speaking merely about very exceptional circumstances? 
The judgment of the Court in McCarthy could be interpreted as pointing in the 
latter direction.60 However, it could also be the case that the Court is unwilling to 
deploy the new approach at full power before it took a solid place in its arsenal of 
legal tools.61 One thing is clear at this stage: the Court has deﬁnitely recognised 
the potential of EU citizenship to enlarge the material scope of EU law62 – a 
welcome development long awaited by some scholars.63
3.2. Implications for the Right to Family Reuniﬁcation: Remaining Question Marks
The new approach, especially as employed by the Court in McCarthy, cannot 
solve all challenges, which were so clearly analysed in the Opinion of AG Sharp-
ston in Ruiz Zambrano. This is particularly true with regard to the area of family 
reuniﬁcation rights. Five main drawbacks can be outlined here.
Firstly, despite the Court’s eﬀorts to shape a renewed vision deﬁning the logic 
behind drawing the boundaries between the scope of application of EU and 
national law, the ‘cross-border movement’ and ‘genuine enjoyment’ tests cannot 
per se rule out a feeling of legal uncertainty. After Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy, 
it would be an overstatement to claim that there is clarity as to where this border 
lies. We still do not know in which factual situations EU law would apply through 
the new test helping family reuniﬁcation with third country nationals. The old 
test does not solve the problem either, for obvious reasons. In one example, would 
it have made a diﬀerence if Mrs. McCarthy ever went on a holiday trip to another 
Member State? Would that in itself be suﬃcient to bring her in the scope of the 
Treaties?64 The Court did not follow the reasoning that Mrs. McCarthy also faced 
a deprivation of her EU citizenship rights since she was not required to leave the 
territory of the Union to live with her husband. While this might be viewed as a 
60) Van Elsuwege, P., ‘European Union Citizenship and the Purely Internal Rule Revisited’, 2011 
EUConst. 7(2), p. 314.
61) Kochenov, supra note 6.
62) Thym & Hailbronner, supra note 50, p. 1255; Van Elsuwege (2011); Kochenov, ibid.
63) Spaventa, supra note 42 (and the literature cited therein).
64) See: AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, para. 86. 
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logical conclusion, given that she could move to any Member State other then the 
UK and bring her husband along, this vision stands to be seriously criticised, 
since, as an economically inactive person she would not meet the residence 
requirements contained in the Directive, meaning that creating a ‘genuine’ cross-
border situation was not an option. The Court is bound to address the interaction 
between the old and the new approaches as well as the general feeling of legal 
uncertainty in the upcoming cases.65
Secondly, the Court’s arguments to diﬀerentiate between Ruiz Zambrano and 
McCarthy are ‘frustratingly opaque’.66 It did not refer to the rule of international 
law that a country cannot expel its own citizens in its Ruiz Zambrano decision 
whereas this constituted a key argument to conclude that EU law was not appli-
cable in the case of McCarthy.67 Should the Court’s observations regarding the 
importance of international law for the residence rights of own nationals in the 
Member States be taken seriously, there is obviously no room for attaching any 
conditions to this right. In other words, it objectively does not matter whether 
nationals have resources or not in order to stay in their Member State of national-
ity, since arguing to the contrary would result in deportations of the unemployed. 
The Court also fails to explain the diﬀerentiation between the conditions for 
granting a residence right to third country national family members under Article 
20 or Article 21 TFEU. In cross-border situations, the application of Article 21 
TFEU and Directive 2004/38 implies that third country family members can 
beneﬁt from a right of residence on the condition that they have suﬃcient 
resources and a sickness insurance so that they do not become an unreasonable 
burden to the public ﬁnances of the host Member State.68 In Ruiz Zambrano the 
Court did not refer to those conditions for the simple reason that they are laid 
down in Directive 2004/38, which was not applicable to that case given the 
absence of any cross-border movement. Hence, by deriving a right of residence 
on the basis of Article 20 TFEU strict residence conditions for third country fam-
ily members do not apply. Of course, the Court granted Mr. Ruiz Zambrano a 
right to work, but this in itself seems not necessarily a guarantee for suﬃcient 
resources.
Thirdly, the Court’s emphasis on the right to reside in the territory of the 
Union in McCarthy puts the right to family life in an unfortunate perspective. In 
65) See, in particular, pending case C-256/11, Murat Derici, Vishaka Heiml, Alban Kokollari, Izunna 
Emmanuel Maduike and Dragica Stevic v. Bundesminister für Inneres. 
66) Lansbergen, A. & Miller, N., ‘European Citizenship Rights in Internal Situations: An Ambiguous 
Revolution?’, 2011 EUConst, 7 (2), p. 287. 
67) Kochenov, supra note 6.
68) This was, for instance, the case in Zhu and Chen, where it was assumed that little Catherine, who had 
acquired the Irish nationality by being born in Belfast but never left the UK, exercised her right of free 
movement under Article 21 TFEU from birth. In this case, the Court observed that Catherine and her 
Chinese mother had suﬃcient resources and a sickness insurance to claim a residence right under EU 
citizenship law.
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fact, not paying attention to the core issue of the case, which is the right of resi-
dence in the UK of Mr. McCarthy – a Jamaican national – results in a total mis-
representation of the ruling of Ruiz Zambrano by the Chamber in this case. The 
rule formulated by the Grand Chamber in Ruiz Zambrano is very simple: Mem-
ber State measures which make the exercise of EU citizenship rights impossible 
come within the scope of EU law and it does not matter whether the person in 
question is in a cross-border situation or not. This is an issue of principle – not a 
question which concerns a particular right, which happened to be the right to 
reside in the territory of the Union in the context of the Ruiz Zambrano factual 
situation.69 It is undisputable, should we read the Treaties carefully, that the right 
to reside in the Union is by far not the only EU citizenship right. To claim that 
the situation of Mrs. McCarthy is outside the scope of EU law because this par-
ticular right is not deemed to be infringed without scrutinising the eﬀects of UK 
policy on her other rights is to reduce the rule of Ruiz Zambrano to its factual 
ﬁnding. To be convincing the Court had to assess whether the UK decision 
amounted to depriving Mrs. McCarthy of her EU citizenship rights. Is the Court 
telling us that the right to family life is not covered? Or can it be – which would 
be very cynical indeed, that only economically active EU citizens have a right to 
family life?
Fourthly, a number of grey zones with potentially far-reaching implications 
emerge out of the Ruiz Zambrano/McCarthy duo. They concern the breadth of 
reading of the Ruiz Zambrano rule by the national authorities. While the majority 
of the Member States, including Belgium, now prevent the acquisition of their 
nationality by children who could obtain some other nationality should their 
parents register them with the consulate, it is clear that the easiest way to acquire 
a Member State nationality and, by consequence, EU citizenship, is to be born to 
an EU citizen parent. The potential implications of Ruiz Zambrano for mixed 
couples composed of an EU citizen and a third country national are overwhelm-
ing indeed.70 The presumption that EU citizen children are not forced to leave the 
territory of the Union if one of their parents is deported, as the Dutch courts 
regrettably assume,71 is unfounded. Ruiz Zambrano was about the father only, but 
its ruling can legitimately be extended to cover the mother of the children too. 
Consequently, both parents will see their situation regularised. This is only normal 
not to ruin the family and is in accordance with ECtHR jurisprudence on Article 
8 ECHR.72 In this context, it would be unreasonable to assume that the essence 
of the family would be diﬀerent if one of the parents were an EU citizen. In other 
words, mixed EU citizen / third country national couples (or former couples) 
69) Kochenov, supra note 6.
70) See: Davies, G., ‘Ruiz Zambrano en de non-EU ouders van (bijna) Nederlandse kinderen’, 2011 Asiel- 
en Migrantenrecht, forthcoming. 
71) E.g. AWB 10/37591.
72) ECtHR, Gül v. Switzerland, Application 23218/94, para. 32.
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with EU citizen children are clearly within the ambit of the Ruiz Zambrano rule. 
A reaﬃrmation of this would seem to be still necessary from the CJEU. Before it 
comes, however, Member States’ own vision will prevail: the Dutch courts will 
continue deporting the mothers from their children.73
Finally, the Court’s new approach does not solve the issue of reverse discrimi-
nation. The introduction of the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ reduces the margin for 
reverse discrimination to a certain extent but, as illustrated in McCarthy, it may 
appear rather diﬃcult to prove that a national measure deprives a person of 
his EU citizenship rights. As a result, a static Member State national such as 
Mrs. McCarthy cannot claim a family reuniﬁcation right under EU law whereas 
a person such as Mr. Carpenter, who occasionally provides services to persons 
established in other EU Member States, can invoke such a right.74 This diﬀeren-
tiation may be regarded as a logical consequence of the division of powers between 
the Union and the Member States,75 but the rather blurred boundaries between 
situations falling inside or outside the scope of application of EU law largely 
undermine the legitimacy and predictability of the Court’s decisions.76
4. Paradoxical Consequences of Reverse Discrimination
Static EU citizens sometimes not only face stricter family reuniﬁcation conditions 
than their migrant compatriots and nationals of other Member States. They may 
also be in a less advantageous position in comparison to third country nationals 
residing lawfully in the territory of a Member State. The latter can beneﬁt from 
the conditions laid down in Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reuniﬁca-
tion within the Union77 or from more beneﬁcial provisions included in interna-
tional agreements.78 This Directive applies to third-country nationals holding a 
residence permit for at least one year with a prospect of permanent residence and 
explicitly excludes family members of Union citizens from its scope of applica-
tion.79 It lays down detailed requirements for the exercise of the right to family 
73) The approach in a number of other Member States is diﬀerent to the Dutch extreme. See e.g. the 
decision of Lady Hale of the High Court of England and Wales in ZH (Tanzania) v. SSHD [2011] 
UKSC 4.
74) Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279. 
75) Hanf, supra note 3, p. 29. 
76) Tryfonidou, supra note 47, p. 34.
77) Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, on the right to family reuniﬁcation, OJ (2003) 
L251/12. Signiﬁcantly, this Directive is not applicable in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
78) Article 3 (4) of Directive 2003/86. Of particular signiﬁcance is the association agreement with Turkey 
and the rules on family reuniﬁcation adopted by the EU-Turkey Association Council. In a recent judg-
ment, a Dutch national court concluded that the right to family reuniﬁcation for legally resident Turkish 
citizens cannot be subject to forced integration measures because such an obligation is contrary to various 
provisions of the association law between the EU and Turkey. See: Centrale Raad van Beroep, 16 August 
2011, LJN: BR4959.
79) Article 3 (3) of Directive 2003/86. 
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reuniﬁcation such as evidence of normal accommodation, sickness insurance and 
suﬃcient resources to maintain the family.80 These being satisﬁed, Member States 
may only reject an application for entry and residence on grounds of public pol-
icy, public security and public health.81 Besides the obvious parallels with the 
conditions for family reuniﬁcation of migrant EU citizens, there are also impor-
tant diﬀerences. So the third country national’s right to family reuniﬁcation is 
limited to the spouse and unmarried minor children.82 Moreover, Member States 
may require family members to participate in integration measures83 as well as 
apply a waiting period of up to two years.84
In its Chakroun judgment, the CJEU clariﬁed that Directive 2003/86 imposes 
‘precise positive obligations’ on the Member States, which requires them to autho-
rise family reuniﬁcation ‘without being left a margin of appreciation’ when the 
necessary conditions are fulﬁlled.85 In evaluating an applicant’s ﬁnancial resources, 
Member States may indicate a certain reference amount but this cannot be con-
sidered a ﬁxed threshold below which all family reuniﬁcations can be refused 
irrespective of an actual examination of individual circumstances. Accordingly, a 
requirement to earn at least 120 % of the minimum wage in the Netherlands was 
deemed to be against the spirit and wording of Directive 2003/86.86
Signiﬁcantly, the protection oﬀered by EU law to migrant EU citizens under 
the conditions of Directive 2004/38 or to third-country nationals on the basis of 
Directive 2003/86 does not exist when it comes to static Member State nationals 
unless, following Ruiz Zambrano, family reuniﬁcation is crucial to preserve the 
genuine enjoyment of their EU citizenship rights. While some Member States, 
such as Italy do not allow reverse discrimination in this domain, others, such as 
the Netherlands or Germany, Cyprus and Lithuania87 provide for family reuniﬁ-
cation rules which are much stricter than their EU counterparts88 and are at times 
de facto basically impossible to satisfy. For instance, the condition of passing an 
80) Article 7 (1) of Directive 2003/86.
81) Article 6 of Directive 2003/86.
82) For migrant EU citizens falling within the scope of Directive 2004/38, this also includes forms of 
registered partnership and dependent direct relatives in the ascending and descending line of both the 
Union citizen and his spouse or partner. See: Article 2 of Directive 2004/38, OJ (2004) L 158/77.
83) Art. 7(2) of Directive 2003/86.
84) Art. 8(1) of Directive 2003/86.
85) Case C-578/08, Chakroun [2010] ECR I-1839, para. 41. 
86) Ibid., paras. 48–52.
87) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reuniﬁcation, COM (2008) 610 ﬁnal, p. 4. 
88) It is noteworthy that in Belgium, the Council of State (Conseil d’état) referred to the Ruiz Zambrano 
ruling to conclude that reverse discrimination resulting from a draft law on the introduction of stricter 
conditions for family reuniﬁcation would be contrary to the provisions of EU law. See: Avis du Conseil 
d’Etat No. 49 356/4, doc. 53 0443/015, 4 April 2011, p. 3 available at: <http://www.lachambre.be/
FLWB/pdf/53/0443/53K0443015.pdf> However, this non-binding advice, which was published before 
the outcome in McCarthy, was not followed by the legislator. The new law on family reuniﬁcation includes 
stronger conditions for family reuniﬁcation for ‘static’ Belgian citizens, such as a 120 % minimum income 
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integration test in Dutch (!) by the spouse at the Netherlands embassy in his 
country of nationality before entering the country makes family reuniﬁcation of 
static Dutch nationals with persons coming from the states covered by this 
requirement de facto impossible: as one easily discovers, trying to ﬁnd a Dutch 
teacher in Uzbekistan, Micronesia, or South Sudan is not an easy task.89
This approach of the national legislator coupled with the inﬂuence of EU law 
amounts to endowing third country nationals with much better possibilities for 
family reuniﬁcation than own nationals who cannot claim a link with EU law. 
Consequently, third country nationals with family members abroad may be 
deterred from naturalisation. This is a rather paradoxical situation, especially tak-
ing into account that naturalisation is often regarded as the best guarantee for the 
successful integration of immigrants in the society of their host state.90 In the 
context of its pre-accession process, for instance, the European Commission rec-
ommended the candidate countries to facilitate their naturalisation conditions in 
order to promote the integration of third-country nationals.91 It could, therefore, 
be a rather unpleasant surprise for a naturalised person to be confronted with 
tougher requirements for family reuniﬁcation. Sporadic attempts of the national 
courts to help nationals in such situation by disregarding their EU citizenship 
make the issue even more acute.92
A speciﬁc problem thus exists for persons holding a dual nationality, including 
the nationality of an EU Member State on the one hand and the nationality of a 
third country on the other hand.93 Since the text of Directive 2003/86 knows no 
rules on dual nationals, the settled case law of the CJEU that citizenship of the 
Union is the primary status of a Member State national becomes the starting 
point. In this context Dutch courts concluded on a number of occasions that the 
Directive does not apply to Dutchmen also having a non-EU nationality.94 While 
recognising that this indeed implies a loss of family reuniﬁcation rights under 
Directive 2003/86, it is argued that this is compensated by the acquisition of new 
requirement, in comparison to other EU citizens and Belgian citizens falling within the scope of EU law. 
See: <http://www.kruispuntmi.be/vreem delingen recht/wegwijs.aspx?id=14758>. 
89) Moreover, civic integration course materials are only available in 18 languages: Chinese, Dari, English, 
French, Indonesian, Moroccan, Pashto, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Somali, Arabic, Tai, Turkish, Urdu, 
Vietnamese, Kurdish, and Berber. Many thanks to Daan Beltman for this information.
90) Carens, J.H. Culture, Citizenship, and Community, Oxford: OUP 2000; Groenendijk, K., ‘Legal Con-
cepts of Integration in EU Migration Law’, 2004 EJML 6(2), pp. 111–126.
91) Van Elsuwege, P. From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political Assessment of the 
Baltic States’ Accession to the European Union, Leiden: Brill 2008, p. 421. 
92) Aliens Chamber Amsterdam 16 November 2005, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2006, 28; Aliens 
Chamber District Court Haarlem 21 December 2005, AWB 05/299, LJN: AU8416.
93) See Kochenov, D., ‘Dual Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance’, 2011 ELJ 17(3), pp. 
323–343; Groenendijk, supra note 1, pp. 227–230.
94) Raad van State (Council of State), 29 March 2006, JV 2006, 172, LJN AW1795, and 2 December 
2008, nr. 200806120/1 (www.raadvanstate.nl); LJN BC9451, Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, AWB 07/33161, 
1 April 2008; LJN BK9140, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 07/6222 WWB, 15 December 2009.
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rights under EU citizenship law.95 Of course, this is under the condition that the 
person concerned satisﬁes the criteria of the cross-border or genuine enjoyment 
test. Hence, it is still possible that a Moroccan-Dutch national living in the Neth-
erlands faces tougher conditions on family reuniﬁcation than a migrant of only 
Moroccan nationality living in the same country.
Exploiting the fact that falling within the scope of EU law makes family reuni-
ﬁcation much easier for EU citizens in a number of countries, tabloids ﬁll up with 
reports of ‘abuse of rights’, i.e. nationals moving to other Member States only to 
beneﬁt from easier family reuniﬁcation requirements.96 Even the Council criti-
cised such ‘abuse of free movement rights’.97 Not surprisingly, such reports mostly 
concern the nationals of the countries where family reuniﬁcation for static EU 
citizens is obstructed. In the Netherlands it is a ‘Belgian route’, in Denmark – a 
Swedish one.98 The ability for EU citizens to rely of EU rules is reinforced by the 
broad interpretation of the cross-border situations by the Court.99 However – 
which might seem counter-intuitive, especially after so much attention has been 
paid to this phenomenon – an authoritative study concluded that any reliable 
evidence of the existence of such phenomenon in the ﬁrst place is actually miss-
ing.100 An obvious solution to the invented problem, which is hardly ever dis-
cussed politically, is simply to stop treating ‘static’ EU citizens worse than 
others.101
5. A Gap in the EU Legal Framework on Family Reuniﬁcation?
The phenomenon of reverse discrimination is usually regarded as an unavoidable 
consequence of the division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States.102 However, nothing seems to prevent the Member States to regulate the 
right to family reuniﬁcation for all EU citizens. After all, Article 79 TFEU pro-
vides an explicit legal basis to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of 
 95) LJN BC9451, Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, AWB 07/33161, 1 April 2008, para. 2.28. 
 96) For analyses see Groenendijk, K. & Fernhout, R., ‘Vrij verkeer, Europa-route en omgekeerde dis-
criminatie: Wie houdt wie voor de gek?’, 2010 A&MR 25(1), pp. 4–17; Bierbach, J.B., ‘European Citi-
zens’ Third-Country Family Members and Community Law’, 2008 EuConst 4(2), pp. 344–362.
 97) Council Document 13467/09, p. 10.
 98) For the analysis of the Dutch context: Bierbach (2008); Vanvoorden, K., ‘Betekenen de arresten Jia 
en Eind het einde van de België-route?’, 2008 Migrantenrecht 23(3), pp. 84–93.
 99) So economic activity after moving back to one’s Member State of nationality is not required, for 
instance, in order to fall within such scope. See: Case C-291/05, Eind [2007] ECR I-10719.
100) Groenendijk & Fernhout, supra note 96, p. 13.
101) This was the recommendation of the Dutch Raad van State: Advies van de Raad van State of 1 July 
2005, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 30 308, nr. 4. This recommendation fell on a deaf ear.
102) Geelhoed, L.A. ‘De vrijheid van personenverkeer en de interne situatie: maatschappelijke dynamiek 
en juridische rafels’, in: Manunza, E. & Senden, L. (eds.), De EU: De interstatelijkheid voorbij? Nijmegen: 
Wolf Legal Publishers 2006, pp. 31–49, 49; Lord Slynn, Introducing a European Legal Order, London: 
Stevens and Sons 1992, p. 99.
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third country nationals ‘including for the purpose of family reuniﬁcation’. This 
provision seems not necessarily limited to situations of family reuniﬁcation 
between third country nationals but may also include family reuniﬁcation between 
(static) Union citizens and their third country family members. In this respect, it 
is also interesting to recall the negotiation history of the existing family reuniﬁca-
tion directive. The ﬁrst Commission proposal explicitly included a right to family 
reuniﬁcation for static Union citizens in an attempt to prevent situations of 
reverse discrimination:
The family reuniﬁcation of Union citizens who do not exercise their right to free movement of per-
sons has hitherto been subject solely to national rules. This situation generates an unwarranted dif-
ference in treatment between the family of Union citizens who have not exercised their right to free 
movement and have stayed in the country of their nationality and those who have exercised their 
right to free movement. National law in some circumstances regulates the family reuniﬁcation of its 
own nationals more restrictively than Community law. As Union citizenship is indivisible, the gap 
must be ﬁlled. This Article accordingly allows the family members of Union citizens to enjoy the 
beneﬁt of the relevant provisions of Community law in matters of family reuniﬁcation.103
This provision was deleted in an amended proposal, mainly because the Commis-
sion in the meantime had started with the drafting of its citizen’s Directive.104 
Accordingly, the alignment of the rights of all Union citizens to family reuniﬁca-
tion was postponed indeﬁnitely. Hence, it appears that political will rather than 
competence excludes an EU solution to deal with reverse discrimination in this 
ﬁeld.
In the current political climate in Europe it is not surprising that harmonisa-
tion of family reuniﬁcation rules is not on the agenda. A choice for the illusion of 
control105 prevails over the desire to ensure equal treatment for all EU citizens. 
Indeed, objections to not using the option to harmonise seem misconceived, since 
they assume the autonomy of the Member States in immigration issues which is 
now severely constrained by the maturing of the Internal Market, and EU citizen-
ship.106 Treating own nationals in family reuniﬁcation matters worse than migrant 
EU citizens and even third country nationals is hard to justify. Arguably, such 
regulation persists for uniquely populist reasons and comes close to racism: it is 
believed that second and third generation migrants are more likely to have a non-
EU partner than ‘white’ citizens. The real face of reverse discrimination is thus 
quite an ugly one. Yet, the involvement of the Member States in solving this issue 
in the long term is indispensable: the gap in the EU-level regulation has to be 
ﬁlled.
103) Proposal of a Council Directive on Family Reuniﬁcation, COM (1999) 638 ﬁnal, p. 14. 
104) Amended Proposal of a Council Directive on Family Reuniﬁcation, COM (2002) 225 ﬁnal, p. 3. 
105) Kochenov, D., Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities under Pressure 
from EU Citizenship, EUI RSCAS Paper 2010, pp. 20–22. 
106) Kostakopoulou, D., ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’, 2007 ELJ 13(5), pp. 623–
646. 
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In the meantime, the Court of Justice tackles the most problematic examples 
of reverse discrimination by extending the scope of application of EU citizenship 
rules to certain purely internal situations.107 It is legitimate to ask whether this is 
a task of the Court.108 Solving issues of reverse discrimination unavoidably implies 
a further harmonisation of national immigration law and this cannot be done 
without the involvement of the Member States and the Union legislator.109 As 
long as the Member States do not take their responsibility in this ﬁeld, the Court 
is obliged to work with imperfect jurisdiction tests with all its consequences of 
legal uncertainty.
6. Family Reuniﬁcation as a Fundamental Human Right?
Both Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy deal with the issues at hand exclusively from 
a terribly narrow perspective of EU citizenship law and ignore the human rights 
dimension of the right to family reuniﬁcation. This may seem somewhat surpris-
ing given the importance attributed to this issue in the Court’s own case law. On 
several occasions, the Court conﬁrmed that the right to respect for family life 
within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR is among the fundamental rights which 
are protected under EU law.110 Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which acquired a legally binding status under the Treaty of Lisbon,111 includes 
numerous references to respect for family life and the rights of the child.112 How-
ever, EU fundamental rights may only be invoked with regard to measures 
adopted by the EU institutions and acts of the Member States that fall ‘within the 
ﬁeld of application of EU law’.113 In other words, a connection with some other 
provision of EU law is indispensable to activate it. The perceived lack of such a 
connection in McCarthy explains the absence of any fundamental rights scrutiny 
107) It would indeed be very diﬃcult to accept that EU law applies to the situation of Zhu and Chen, who 
never left the territory of the United Kingdom, and not to Ruiz Zambrano. See: Van Elsuwege P., ‘Shifting 
the Boundaries? European Union Citizenship and the Scope of Application of EU Law’, 2011 LIEI 38 
(3), pp. 263–276. 
108) Van der Mei, A.P., ‘Combating Reverse Discrimination. Who Should do the Job?’, 2009 MJ 16(4), 
pp. 379–382.
109) So far, attempts to create coherent EU migration policy via legislation have not been successful: Car-
rera, S. et al., Labour Immigration Policy in the EU: A Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020, CEPS Policy Brief 
2011, p. 1.
110) Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279 para. 41; Case C-540/03, European Parliament v. 
Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para. 52; Case C-459/99, MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, para. 53; Case 
C-127/08, Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, para. 62; Case C-291/05, Eind [2007] ECR I-10719, para. 44. 
111) Article 6 TEU. 
112) Article 7 (respect for private and family life); Article 9 (right to marry and right to found a family); 
Article 33 (family and professional life); Article 24 (rights of the child). 
113) Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford: OUP 2005, p. 39; Lenaerts, K. & Gutierrez-
Fons, J.A., ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’, 2010 CMLRev. 
47(6), pp. 1629–1670, at p. 1659. 
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on the part of the CJEU.114 In contrast, the situation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano came 
within the ambit of EU law, but here as well respect for family life was apparently 
not a conclusive argument to grant employment and residence rights to the third 
country family members.
The Court’s ignorance of this indispensable fundamental rights case-law may 
be explained by the important diﬀerences between the right to family reuniﬁca-
tion following from the application of EU citizenship law in comparison to the 
protection oﬀered under Article 8 ECHR. The human rights approach is essen-
tially based on a balancing exercise between the State interests to control the 
entry, residence and expulsion of non-nationals, on the one hand, and the indi-
vidual circumstances of the family, on the other hand. In other words, Article 8 
ECHR does not include a clear-cut right to family reuniﬁcation but only imposes 
a minimum level of protection to be respected by the Member States. Whether or 
not a national measure actually violates Article 8 ECHR largely depends upon the 
particular circumstances of each case. In this respect, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) provides a wide margin of appreciation for immigration 
control on the part of the Member States.115 Factors to be taken into account in 
this exercise are, amongst others, ‘the extent to which family life is eﬀectively 
ruptured, the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are insur-
mountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of one 
or more of them and whether there are factors of immigration control (for exam-
ple, a history of breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order 
weighing in favour of exclusion’.116 Of particular signiﬁcance are the timing and 
the circumstances of the family formation. When family life is created at a time 
when the immigration status of one of the persons involved is precarious, the 
removal of the non-national family member is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR 
only in exceptional circumstances. In Darren Omoregie, for instance, the ECtHR 
concluded that the refusal of Norway to grant a residence right to a Nigerian 
national who was married with his Norwegian wife and with whom he had a 
child did not violate Article 8 ECHR precisely because their family relationship 
was established when the applicant stayed in Norway unlawfully. In the Court’s 
view, both partners should have known from the start ‘that their prospects of 
being able to settle as a couple in Norway were precarious’.117 The child was, in 
the Court’s words, ‘still at an adaptable age at the time when the disputed 
114) Arguably, any other solution could lead to allegations of an ultra vires application of EU law. See, on 
this point, Van Elsuwege, supra note 60, p. 322. 
115) Thym, D., ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A 
Human Right to Regularise Illegal Stay?’, 2008 ICLQ 57(1), pp. 87–112.
116) Application No. 265/07, Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway, 31 July 2008, para. 57; Application 
No. 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva/Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 31 January 2006, para 39; Application 
No. 27663/95, Ajayi and Others v. the United Kingdom 22 June 1999; Application No. 44328/98, Solo-
mon v. the Netherlands, 5 September 2000.
117) Application No. 265/07, Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway, 31 July 2008, para. 59. 
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measures were decided and implemented’ and therefore it did not ﬁnd any insur-
mountable obstacles to develop family life in Nigeria.118 In light of this judgment, 
it may appear uncertain whether the Belgian treatment of Ruiz Zambrano could 
be regarded as a violation of Article 8 ECHR.119
However, in the comparable case of Rodrigues da Silva, the ECtHR found that 
the threatened removal of the Brazilian mother of a Dutch minor child violated 
Article 8 ECHR and this notwithstanding the fact that she was residing unlaw-
fully in the Netherlands at the time of her child’s birth and no longer lived 
together with her Dutch partner.120 The Court took into account the child’s inter-
ests and the observation that lawful residence in the Netherlands would have 
been possible during the period of the applicant’s relationship with her Dutch 
partner.121 In the more recent Nunez v. Norway judgment, the ECtHR conﬁrmed 
the importance of child interests in assessing the balance between the competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole.122 In this case, a 
Dominican national arrived in Norway in 1996 as a tourist. After she was found 
guilty of theft, the Norwegian authorities deported her with a prohibition to re-
enter Norway for a period of two years. Four months later, she returned to Nor-
way with a diﬀerent passport and shortly afterwards she married a Norwegian 
national. After the couple divorced, Mrs. Nunez co-habited with a settled immi-
grant of Dominican origin in Norway. Together, they had two daughters. Despite 
the incontestable breach of Norwegian immigration law and the observation that 
Mrs. Nunez could not reasonably have entertained any expectation of being able 
to remain in the country123 – thus reﬂecting the Darren Omoregie situation – the 
ECtHR nevertheless concluded that it was in the children’s interest that their 
mother stayed in Norway.124 As argued in the concurring opinion of Judge Jebens, 
this approach, which emphasises the priority to be given to the interests of the 
child in assessing a potential violation of Article 8 ECHR, inevitably reduces the 
States’ margin of appreciation in such cases.125
Applied to the circumstances of the Ruiz Zambrano case, it may well be argued 
that the Belgian expulsion decision also violated Article 8 ECHR and the funda-
mental right to family life as part of the general principles of EU law. The impact 
118) Ibid. para. 66.
119) Hailbronner & Thym, supra note 50, p. 1261. 
120) Application No. 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva/Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 31 January 2006.
121) She never applied for a residence permit due to unavailability of documents concerning her partner’s 
income.
122) Application No. 55597/09, Nunez v. Norway, 28 June 2011.
123) Ibid., paras. 72–74.
124) Ibid., paras. 81–84.
125) Concurring Opinion of Judge Jebens to Application No. 55597/09, Nunez v. Norway, 28 June 2011. 
In their joint dissenting opinion to this case judges Mijovic and Gaetano conﬁrmed and regretted this 
trend by arguing that this line of case law ‘will send the wrong signal, namely that persons who are ille-
gally in a country can somehow contrive to have their residence “legitimised” through the expedient of 
marriage and of having children’. 
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of the envisaged deportation of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano on his children would be 
tremendous. They would no longer be able to live an independent life in Bel-
gium, where they were born and raised.126 It seems, therefore, that the Darren 
Omoregie proviso does not apply in this case as a result of the children’s interests 
and in line with the ECtHR conclusion in Nunez v. Norway. The explicit provi-
sion of Article 24 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that ‘in all actions 
related to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, 
the children’s best interests must be a primary consideration’, reinforces this inter-
pretation. This all makes the CJEU’s ignorance of the fundamental rights dimen-
sion even more surprising. However, the crucial question in Ruiz Zambrano was 
whether or not this situation fell within the scope of EU law. Without such a link, 
the fundamental rights protected by the EU simply do not apply. As it appeared 
that the granting of a work and residence permit to Mr. Ruiz Zambrano derives 
directly from the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, a fundamental rights assess-
ment was unnecessary to conclude the case.
In contrast to the Member State’s discretionary power in the context of the 
ECHR, the rules on EU citizenship provide clear-cut rights for individuals that 
fall within its scope of application,127 without leaving much appraisal for the 
Member States.128 Moreover, Article 8 ECHR does not grant a right of entry or 
residence in order to be reunited with family members in a speciﬁc country.129 If 
it is possible for the family to live together elsewhere, it is likely that no interfer-
ence with the right to respect for family life will be found130 – although notable 
examples to the contrary can also be provided.131 The situation is quite diﬀerent 
under EU law, where residence in the territory of the Union plays a crucial role. 
In Metock, for instance, the Court clariﬁed that ‘the refusal of the host Member 
State to grant rights of entry and residence to the family members of a Union 
citizen is such as to discourage that citizen from moving to or residing in that 
Member State’.132 If migrant Union citizens would not be allowed to be accompa-
nied by their third country family members in the host Member State, the 
126) Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, para. 63.
127) It is noteworthy that EU law works very diﬀerently in practice with regard to same-sex couples, de 
facto allowing the Member States to ignore each other’s deﬁnitions of ‘family’. See: Kochenov, D., ‘On 
Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European Federalism’, 2009 Fordham. J. Int’l 
L. 33(1), pp. 156–206.
128) Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 45; Case C-578/08, Chakroun, [2010] 
ECR I-1839, para. 41.
129) Application No 23218/94, Gül v. Switzerland, judgment of 19 February 1996, para. 38; Application 
No. 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva/Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, 31 January 2006, para. 39; Application 
No. 55597/09, Nunez v. Norway, 28 June 2011, para. 66.
130) E.g. Application No 21702/93, Ahmut v. the Netherlands, judgment of 28 November 1996, para. 71; 
Application 53102/99, Chandra and Others v. the Netherlands, decision of 13 May 2003; Application 
No. 265/07, Darren Omoregie and Others v. Norway, 31 July 2008, para. 66. 
131) E.g. Application No 48321/99 Slivenko et al. v. Latvia, judgment of 9 October 2003; Application 
No. 60654/00 Sisojeva et al. v. Latvia, judgment of 15 January 2007.
132) Case C-127/08, Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, para. 64. 
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exercise of the free movement of persons would be seriously obstructed. Signiﬁ-
cantly, with regard to static Member State nationals the criterion is diﬀerent and 
concerns the question whether or not a person’s residence ‘in the territory of the 
Union’ is at stake.133
In other words, EU citizenship oﬀers a diﬀerent and often more extensive pro-
tection of family life than Article 8 ECHR. This may be regarded as a welcome 
development but, at the same time, it reinforces the feeling that issues of reverse 
discrimination are hard to accept in ‘a Union under the rule of law, in which 
respect for fundamental rights must necessarily play an integral part’.134 The 
Court’s silence on the human rights dimension on the right to family life is regret-
table but understandable in light of the limits imposed on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights – which was moreover not legally binding at the 
time of the relevant facts – and the warning against judicial activism in the Lisbon 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court.135
7. Concluding Remarks
At the current stage of the European integration process, the right to family reuni-
ﬁcation is not a self-standing right under EU citizenship law. In the eyes of the 
CJEU its importance is reduced to a functional instrument in order to guarantee, 
on the one hand, the right to free movement of persons, as well as, on the other 
hand, the genuine enjoyment of EU citizens’ other rights stemming from EU 
law. Paradoxically, this situation is diﬀerent for legally resident third country 
nationals who can claim a direct right to family reuniﬁcation in their resident 
Member State on the basis of Directive 2003/86. A majority of static Union resi-
dents, on the other hand, remains subject to the case by case approach of the 
ECtHR and the protection which is oﬀered, if they are lucky, under national 
constitutional law.
The diﬀerent options for family reuniﬁcation depending upon whether a per-
son manages to ﬁnd a link with the scope of application of EU law and, in par-
ticular, the legal uncertainty about the exact limits of the Court’s ‘cross-border’ 
and ‘genuine enjoyment’ tests reinforce the perception that reverse discrimination 
against a certain category of static Union citizens is fundamentally unfair. This 
conclusion is reinforced once the assumptions behind the national regulation 
responsible for reverse discrimination are in order. In this context, denying an EU 
dimension to the family reuniﬁcation claims of static EU citizens against their 
133) Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000, para. 44; Case C-434/09, McCarthy [2011] 
ECR I-0000, para. 50. 
134) Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, para. 3. 
135) See, on this point, Van Elsuwege, supra note 60, p. 322. 
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home Member States is becoming increasingly untenable.136 The discussion on 
the revision of Directive 2003/86, to be launched with a Commission Green 
Paper in November 2011, may therefore be a good opportunity to initiate legisla-
tive action in this ﬁeld.
136) Costello, C., ‘Metock: Free Movement and “Normal Family Life” in the Union’, 2009 CMLRev. 
46(2), pp. 587–622, 622. 
